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Abstract. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems aim to identify objects in open en-
vironments with neither physical nor visual contact. They consist of transponders inserted into
objects, of readers, and usually of a database which contains information about the objects. The
key point is that authorised readers must be able to identify tags without an adversary being able
to trace them. Traceability is often underestimated by advocates of the technology and sometimes
exaggerated by its detractors. Whatever the true picture, this problem is a reality when it blocks
the deployment of this technology and some companies, faced with being boycotted, have already
abandoned its use. Using cryptographic primitives to thwart the traceability issues is an approach
which has been explored for several years. However, the research carried out up to now has not
provided satisfactory results as no universal formalism has been defined. In this paper, we propose
an adversary model suitable for RFID environments. We define the notions of existential and uni-
versal untraceability and we model the access to the communication channels from a set of oracles.
We show that our formalisation fits the problem being considered and allows a formal analysis of
the protocols in terms of traceability. We use our model on several well-known RFID protocols and
we show that most of them have weaknesses and are vulnerable to traceability.
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1 Introduction
1.1 RFID Motivation
Often presented as a new technological revolution, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) makes the
identification of objects in open environments possible, with neither physical nor visual contact. RFID
systems are made up of transponders inserted into the objects, of readers which communicate with the
transponders using radio frequencies and usually of a database which contains information on the tagged
objects.
This technology is not fundamentally new. It has existed for several decades and has been used in the
public domain for several years, for example in ticketing on public transport or ski-lifts, on motorway
tollgates, or even for animal identification. RFID technology is thus found on a whole range of applications
which have very different purposes and therefore different needs. The boom which RFID technology is
enjoying today rests essentially on the willingness to develop low-cost transponders (for around of 5 US
cents) thus rendering them disposable. Such transponders are called tags. Advocates of this technology
say that they are the super barcodes of the future. Indeed, identification by radio frequency represents a
major innovation in relation to optical identification. It allows objects to be read en masse, without the
need for visual contact, and each tag has a unique identifier representing a single object, unlike barcodes.
Moreover, the minute size of the tags allows them to be implanted within objects.
One area of application for RFID tags is the management of stock and inventories in shops and
warehouses. The American mass-marketing giant, Wal-Mart, has recently placed a requirement on its
main suppliers that they use electronic tags on the palettes and cartons that are delivered to its stores.
The advantages of using RFID tags can also be seen, for example, in libraries where putting an electronic
tag in each book simplifies the borrowing and returning procedures and facilitates the staff’s job. Several
libraries in the United States have already adopted the RFID technology, e.g., the Santa Clara City
Library in California, the University of Nevada, the Las Vegas Library, and the Eugene Oregon Public
Library [22]. Among the actual applications, we can also cite locating people in a public area, e.g.,
amusement parks [25]. The aim is to help customers to keep in touch with other members of their group
in the park.
1.2 RFID Primer
RFID tags are electronic microcircuits equipped with an antenna. The least expensive ones have only
extremely limited computation, storage, and communication capacities, because of the cost and size re-
strictions dictated by the targeted applications. Capabilities of the tags ensue from the ISO standards [15]
and the EPC Global Inc. standards [8].
Tags have no microprocessors and are equipped with only a few thousand logic gates at the very most,
which makes it a real challenge to integrate encryption or signature algorithms into these devices. This
difficulty is reinforced by the fact that the tags are passive, meaning that they do not have an internal
power source: they use the power supplied by the reader. Fortunately, promising research is being done
at the moment, notably the implementation of AES encryption for RFID tags proposed by Feldhofer,
Dominikus and Wolkerstorfer [10]. Note that such an implementation cannot fit a very low-cost tag, but
it may be suited to reasonably inexpensive tags.
The storage capacities of RFID tags are also extremely limited. The cheapest devices have between
64 and 128 bits of ROM only, which allows the unique identifier of the tag to be stored, but adding
EEPROM remains an option for more developed applications. Contrary to smartcards made for secure
applications (credit cards, pay TV, etc.), the tags are not tamper-resistant. This fact does not mean that
all security measures are impossible. Indeed, we have to consider the cost of the attack in relation to its
gain. For example, the ease of reading the content of a tag may be counter-balanced by the difficulty of
getting access to it. Subcutaneous tags are a good illustration of this difficulty of access. A less extreme
example is the use of tags in bracelets to locate people in enclosed spaces: the tag could be initialised
when it is given out to a customer and the data could be erased when the customer gives the bracelet
back. However, it would not be secure for all the tags to contain the same secret, as the cost of the attack
could become negligible when compared with the gain.
The communication distance between tags and readers depends on numerous parameters, in particular
the communication frequency. Two main categories of RFID systems coexist: the systems using the
frequency 13.56MHz and the systems using the frequency 860-960MHz, for which the communication
range is greater. In this latter case, the information sent by the reader can be received in practice up to
a hundred meters, but the information returned from the tag to the reader reaches a few meters at most.
These limits, resulting from the standards and regulations in place do not mean that the tags cannot be
read from a greater distance. Indeed, an attacker could exceed these limits, for example by transgressing
the laws relating to the maximum power.
1.3 RFID Security Issues
Security problems in RFID systems can be put into two categories. The first concerns those attacks
which aim to wipe out the functioning of the system, e.g., denial of service attacks. The second category,
the one which interests us, is related to privacy: the problem is information leakage, as a tag may reveal
data about an object which contains it (for example the title or author of the book) and also traceability.
Information leakage can be avoided if the tag only transmits one identifier which can only be used by
those persons having access to the system’s database. However, this does not prevent traceability. By
“traceability” we mean that an adversary is able to recognize a tag which he has already seen, at another
time or in another place. The traceability of tags, and by extension of people, is a difficulty that RFID
technology must surmount if it is to be widely used. For example, companies like Gillette and Benetton
have been the victims of virulent boycott campaigns [29].
Beyond hardware-based techniques [11, 20], many researchers have looked into the problem in order
to design protocols which allow authorised persons to identify the tags without an adversary being able
2
to trace them. Among them, the principal players are Avoine [1–3], Feldhofer [9, 10], Juels [12, 16–21],
Molnar and Wagner [13,18,22], Ohkubo [23,24], Saito and Sakurai [26,27], and Weis [21,28,30–32].
Most schemes are 3-round protocols (or can be reduced to this type of protocol) as described in Fig. 1.
The first message may be a purely starting signal or may contain data, e.g., a nonce. The principle of
the schemes rests on the fact that the information contained in the second message changes at each
new identification. This information could be either the tag’s identifier (which is then renewed each time
the protocol is executed), or an encrypted version of this identifier (which is then static in the tag, but
encrypted with a probabilistic algorithm). Whichever the solution, exchanged information is refreshed
at each identification, according to a procedure which differentiates the existing protocols. Indeed, either
the tag is capable of refreshing this information itself or it needs help from the reader. In the first case,
the third message is not used for the identification of the tag but it may be used to ensure authentication
of the reader (e.g., [10,22]). In the latter case, the third message contains data which are used by the tag
in the “refreshment” process. Obviously, the less computations carried out by the tag, the less the cost
of the tag is, but ensuring privacy without using any cryptographic functions would be a pipedream, as
shown in [2].
Database
information
request
data to refresh the information
Tag
Fig. 1. Identification protocol
Designing and analysing RFID protocols is still a real challenge because no universal model has been
defined: up until now designs and attacks have been made in a pedestrian way. In this paper we put
forward just such a formalism for traceability suited to RFID protocols. We thus define in Sect. 2 the
notions of existential and universal untraceability and we model access to the communication channels
from a set of oracles. We show in Sect. 3 that our formalism fits RFID and allows a formal analysis of the
protocols. We use our model in order to analyse several existing protocols and show that in a realistic
model, many protocols are not resistant to traceability.
2 Adversary Model
2.1 Modelling the System
An RFID system is made up of entities (database, readers, and tags) as well as communication channels.
Looking at the security of information contained by the database and the readers has little relevance
here as these devices do not have particular restrictions and can therefore make use of appropriate
cryptographic techniques. In practice, either the readers do not store sensitive information (in which
case they can be compared to simple physical devices of no interest from a security point of view),
or they store sensitive information (in which case they can benefit from being protected by adequate
measures). For these same reasons, studying the communication channel between the database and the
readers is not relevant. Hence, readers and database are often considered as a single and unique entity
in the security analysis.
The sources of information which can benefit an adversary are therefore limited to the communication
channel between the reader and the tag as well as the contents of the memory of the tag. As we have seen
in Sect. 1.2, the communication distance from a reader to a tag (forward channel) is generally longer
than the distance from a tag to a reader (backward channel). It is worthwhile studying these two channels
separately since certain protocols benefit from this asymmetry. Finally, the memory of the tag can be
represented as another channel, called the memory channel. These channels are represented in Fig. 2.
From a theoretical point of view, each of these channels can be accessed by reading and/or in writing,
or not accessible at all. In practice, some of these combinations are more realistic than others and we
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Fig. 2. Information channels of an RFID system
disregard some of the less likely combinations, e.g., we do not consider writing access to the memory
channel although fault injection attacks could be relevant. Moreover, we consider that an adversary will
only be able to read the memory channel once. One may argue that, even if such an attack is destructive,
an adversary could create a clone of the tag using the data she discovered. However, we have no way
to prevent an attack where the adversary can access the memory channel as many times she wants.
As we will see below, limiting the access to the memory channel is strongly related to the notion of
forward untraceability. Finally, we consider that the contents of the tags are independent. With the aim
of obtaining a realistic and applicable model, we are limiting the adversary’s means to the oracles defined
in Sect. 2.2. Goals of the adversary will be defined in Sect. 2.3.
2.2 Means of the Adversary
Nowadays, the formalisation of the adversary model is required in every security proof. Such a model
consists of the means of the adversary and its goals. For example, in confidentiality, it is common practice
to look at the chosen plaintext attacks (CPA), the non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA1), and
the adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA2). In terms of signatures, we consider mainly the known-
message attacks (KMA) and the adaptive chosen message attacks (CMA). We define below the means of
an adversary A in an RFID system. These means are represented using oracles. We denote a tag T and
a reader R that can participate in the RFID protocol P . Each of them can run several instances of P .
We denote tag instances by piiT and reader instances by pi
j
R.
– Query(piiT ,m1,m3): this query models A sending a request m1 to T through the forward channel and
subsequently sending it the message m3 after having received its answer.
– Send(pijR,m2): this query models A sending the message m2 to R through the backward channel and
receiving its answer.
– Execute(piiT , pi
j
R): this query models A executing an instance of P between T and R, obtaining so the
messages exchanged on both the forward and the backward channels.
– Execute∗(piiT , pi
j
R): this query models A executing an instance of P between T and R, but obtaining
the messages exchanged on the forward channel only.
– Reveal(piiT ): this query models A obtaining the content of T ’s memory channel. This query can be
used only once such that Query, Send, Execute, and Execute∗ can no longer be used after.
We will say that a protocol is resistant to attacks A-O or that it is A-O if it is resistant to an at-
tack A when the adversary has access to the oracles of O ⊂ {Q,S,E,E∗,R} where Q, S, E, E∗ and
R represent respectively the oracles Query, Send, Execute, Execute∗ and Reveal. For ease of legibility,
we will simplify the notation by writing down for example A-QSE instead of A-{Q,S,E}. We will write
down ωi(T ) as the result of the application of an oracle Q, E, E∗, or R on a tag T . We therefore have
ωi(T ) ∈ {Query(piiT , ∗),Execute(piiT , ∗),Execute∗(piiT , ∗),Reveal(piiT )}.
2.3 Goals of the Adversary
The security proof of a protocol equally rests on the formalisation of the aims of an adversary. Thus we
require that a public key encryption scheme verifies, for example, the properties of indistinguishability
(IND) or of non-malleability (NM), or that a signature scheme is resistant to forgery or to total break.
In the framework of identification by radio frequency, we introduce the notion of untraceability (UNT).
Untraceability is characterised by two fundamental points.
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– By the very physical nature of the tags, an adversary who stays in contact with the tag is clearly
capable of tracing it. This physical tracing cannot be thwarted. While the adversary is physically
tracing a tag, she is in a position to determine which executions of the protocol are linked to the tag.
We thus define an interaction as a set of executions on the same tag at a time when the adversary is
in a position to physically identify it. An interaction is more precisely defined by ΩI(T ) = {ωi(T ) |
i ∈ I} ∪ {Send(pii∗, ∗) | i ∈ J} where J ⊂ N. By definition, the length of an interaction ΩI(T ) is | I |.
We will suppose below that I is a sub-interval of N.
– When an adversary is in a position to trace a tag, she can do it in a temporary way (e.g., as
long as an honest reader has not interrogated it) or infinitely. These cases will lead to the notions
of existential and universal untraceability. By way of a comparison, security of signature schemes
consider universal, random, selective, or existential forgery.
Broadly speaking, after having interacted with a target T and possibly some readers and thus ob-
taining an interaction ΩI(T ), whose length is less than a given parameter `ref, an adversary A needs to
find her target among two tags T1 and T2 which are presented to her. For that, she can query both T1
and T2, thus obtaining two interactions ΩI1(T1) and ΩI2(T2) whose lengths are less than a given length
`chal. What differentiates existential and universal is the manner in which I1 and I2 are fixed. If there
exist I1 and I2 such that A is able to succeed then we talk of existential traceability. If she is able to win
for all I1 and I2, then we talk of universal traceability.
We consider below Oracle which, being given T and I sends back ΩˆI(T ). Oracle allows us to
simulate the set of oracles to which the adversary has access. Here, Oracle will call the oracles of
O ⊂ {Q,S,E,E∗,R} according to model chosen. The interaction Ωˆi(T ) is the interaction which max-
imises the adversary’s advantage. We also look at a Challenger which supplies two tags to the adversary,
one of which is the target tag. We define below the notion of untraceability.
Existential Untraceability
Parameters: `ref, `chal, O.
1. A requests the Challenger thus receiving her target T .
2. A chooses I and calls Oracle(T, I,O) where |I| ≤ `ref then receives ΩˆI(T ).
3. A requests the Challenger thus receiving her challenge T1 and T2.
4. A chooses I1 and I2 such that |I1| ≤ `chal, |I2| ≤ `chal, and (I1 ∪ I2) ∩ I = ∅.
5. A calls Oracle(T1, I1,O) and Oracle(T2, I2,O), then receives ΩˆI1(T1) and ΩˆI2(T2).
6. A decides which of T1 or T2 is T , then outputs her guess T ′.
Universal Untraceability
Parameters: `ref, `chal, O.
1. A requests the Challenger thus receiving her target T .
2. A chooses I and calls Oracle(T, I,O) where |I| ≤ `ref then receives ΩˆI(T ).
3. A requests the Challenger thus receiving her challenge T1, T2, I1, and I2.
4. A calls Oracle(T1, I1,O) and Oracle(T2, I2,O), then receives ΩˆI1(T1) and ΩˆI2(T2).
5. A decides which of T1 or T2 is T , then outputs her guess T ′.
It is usually useful to restrict the choice of I1 and I2 made by the adversary (existential) or by the chal-
lenger (universal) such that I < I1, I2 (resp. I > I1, I2). We denote then Existential+ (resp. Existential−)
and Universal+ (resp. Universal−). The notion of Universal− is particularly relevant when the oracle R is
used, and meets the notion of forward privacy defined in [3]. We will consequently refer to this notion
as Forward-UNT. For each of these variants, we define the advantage of A for a given protocol P by:
AdvUNTP (A) = 2Pr(T ′ = T )− 1
where the probability space is over all the random tags. If A’s advantage is negligible with the parameters
`ref, `chal, and O, P is said to be UNT`ref,`chal-O secure, usually simply denoted by UNT-O.
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2.4 Implications and Separations
One can mix and match the goals {Existential-UNT, Forward-UNT, Universal-UNT} of the adversary and
her means O ⊂ {Q, S,E,E∗,R}. From [4], we give the following relations, respectively called implication
and separation:
A→ B: a proof that if an RFID protocol P meets the notion of security A then P also meets notion
of security B.
A 6→ B: A construction of an RFID protocol P that provably meets notion of security A but provably
does not meet the notion of security B.
Definitions supplied in Sect. 2.3 lead us clearly to the relations:
Existential-UNT → Forward-UNT → Universal-UNT
Given the definitions of Existential-UNT, Forward-UNT, and Universal-UNT, proofs are straightforward. We
now consider the relations between the means of the adversary. By definition, we have UNT-E→ UNT-E∗
but UNT-E∗ 6→ UNT-E. Moreover,
∀A,B ∈ {Q,S,E,R},UNT-A 6→ UNT-B.
We have however QS → E and E 6→ QS. The implication comes from the fact that an adversary having
access to the Q and S oracles can simulate E using a man-in-the-middle attack. The separation comes
from the fact that the adversary is passive when using the E oracle and therefore cannot modify the
messages, contrary to Q and S. Another important implication is:
(∀O,O′ ⊂ {Q,S,E,E∗,R},O′ ⊂ O) =⇒ (UNT-O → UNT-O′).
Indeed, if the adversary is not able to track a tag with the set of oracles O, she cannot succeed with
a smaller set of oracles. In practice, certain combinations are more relevant than others. Thus, we will
only focus on UNT-E, UNT-Q, UNT-QSE, and UNT-QSER. From the above results, we have:
UNT-QSER→ UNT-QSE→
∣∣∣∣UNT-EUNT-Q
It is clear that a protocol should be both UNT-Q and UNT-E, meaning that an adversary should not be
capable of tracking a tag only by querying it or only by eavesdropping the channels. In practice, a protocol
must be Existential-UNT-QSE and Forward-UNT-QSER. So the adversary is never capable of tracking a
tag when she can interact with both the target tag and the readers, and eavesdrop executions between
the tag and readers. Moreover, obtaining the content of the tag by tampering with it does not allow
the adversary to track it in the past (e.g., by analysing the reader logs). In some specific applications,
Existential-UNT-QSE is enough if the adversary is not able to physically tamper with its target as we
saw in Sect. 1.2. Note that designing a Existential-UNT-QSER protocol does not make sense because if
the adversary is able to obtain the content of the tag, obtaining so as information as the tag itself, she
will be able to trace it in the future (at least during the identification just following the attack).
3 Attacks on Existing Protocols
3.1 Protocol of Golle, Jakobsson, Juels and Syverson
The protocol of Golle et al. [12] relies on the concept of universal re-encryption, i.e., a scheme where
re-encryptions of a message m are performed neither requiring nor yielding knowledge of the public
key under which m has been encrypted initially. The scheme consists of encrypting a plaintext m by
appending two ciphertexts: the first one is the ElGamal encryption of m while the second one is the
ElGamal encryption of the neutral element of G, where G is the underlying group for the cryptosystem.
We detail the scheme here. Let E be the ElGamal encryption scheme, and U be the corresponding re-
encryption scheme, we have U(m) := [E(m);E(1G)]. Let q be the order of G, and g a generator. The
universal re-encryption scheme is defined by the following four algorithms:
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– Key generation: output the private key x ∈ Z and the public key y = gx.
– Encryption: let (r0, r1) be a random element picked in Z2q. The encrypted value of a message m is
U(m) = [(α0, β0); (α1, β1)] = [(myr0 , gr0); (yr1 , gr1)].
– Decryption: given the ciphertext [(α0, β0); (α1, β1)], if α0,β0,α1,β1 ∈ G and α1/βx1 = 1, then the
plaintext is α0/βx0 .
– Re-encryption: let (r′0, r
′
1) be a random element picked in Z2q. The re-encrypted value of a ciphertext
[(α0, β0); (α1, β1)] is [(α0α
r′0
1 , β0β
r′0
1 ); (α
r′1
1 , β
r′1
1 )].
We now describe the RFID protocol suggested by Golle et al., based on their universal re-encryption
scheme. During the initialisation of the tag, an encrypted identifier is stored in the tag. On the other
hand, this encrypted identifier as well as the secret key corresponding to the tag is stored in the database.
An execution is carried out as follows: (1) The reader sends a request to the tag; (2) The tag sends back its
encrypted identifier; (3) The reader re-encrypts the identifier of the tag using the universal re-encryption
scheme described above and sends the new value to the tag (Fig. 3).
request
Database TagReader
[(α0, β0); (α1, β1)]
[(α0α
r0
1 , β0β
r0
1 ); (α
r1
1 , β
r1
1 )]
Fig. 3. Protocol of Golle, Jakobsson, Juels, and Syverson
As noted in [12], if an attacker sends a fake re-encrypted identifier to the tag, the database will not
be able to identify the tag in the future. According to [12], this attack does not allow the tag to be
traced, at the most it will harm the normal functioning of the system. The authors do, however, reveal
an exception: when an adversary replaces the value (α1, β1) by (1G , 1G) where 1G represents the neutral
element of G, the future re-encryptions will no longer change the identifier. The tag can protect itself
from this attack by verifying that (α1, β1) is not equal to (1G , 1G) before changing its value. However,
the Golle et al.’s protocol suffers also from other weaknesses which we describe below.
Attack based on eavesdropping. The first thing to see is that the protocol does not resist to simple
eavesdropping attacks. Indeed, since the tag sends in the second message what it received in the third
message of the previous execution, an attacker is able to track the tag by eavesdropping; in other words,
the protocol is not Existential-UNT-E.
Attack based on invariants. The weakness described here results from the fact that the ciphertext sent
by the tag is not random. Taken independently, every element of the ciphertext [(α0, β0); (α1, β1)] follows
a uniform distribution assuming that the discrete logarithm is a random function, but these elements are
not independent. Thus, if the attacker is able to choose α0, β0, α1, β1 verifying a relation invariant by re-
encryption, i.e., a relation which remains verified after re-encryptions, then she will (almost certainly) be
able to trace the tag. Let us take the relationR such that (α0, β0, α1, β1) verifiesR if, and only if α1 = β1.
Let us denote α(k)0 , β
(k)
0 , α
(k)
1 and β
(k)
1 the values contained in the tag after the k-th re-encryption. R is
invariant by re-encryption: if (α0, β0, α1, β1) verifies R, then (α(k)0 , β(k)0 , α(k)1 , β(k)1 ) verifies it as well for
all k, since the same operation is carried out on both α1 and β1 during a re-encryption. In order to trace
a tag, the attacker therefore has to replace α1 and β1 by a same value. When she next interrogates the
tag and receives the reply [(α′0, β
′
0); (α
′
1, β
′
1)], she verifies if α
′
1 = β
′
1. In this case, the interrogated tag is
her target with probability 1− 1q where q is the order of G. While the tag could detect such an attack by
testing that α1 6= β1, there are other invariant relations, e.g., the relation R′ such that (α0, β0, α1, β1)
verifies R′ if, and only if, α1 · β1 = 1 in G. Game 1 given in the appendix is a formalisation of the
attack. It shows that the advantage of the adversary considering an existential attack is 1 − 1/(2q). So
the protocol is not Existential-UNT-Q.
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Theorem 1. Golle, Jakobsson, Juels and Syverson’s protocol is neither Existential-UNT-Q nor
Existential-UNT-E.
3.2 Protocol of Saito, Ryou, and Sakurai
Saito et al. also pointed out an attack (see [27]) against the protocol of Golle et al.. They subsequently
suggested two RFID protocols based on [12]. The first one, described below, is called “with a check”,
and the second one, described in Sect. 3.3, is called “With One-Time Pad”. The first protocol is an
improvement of [12] where the operations carried out by the tag have been modified: the tag checks the
new value re-encrypted by the reader before accepting it as the new identifier. The aim is to detect an
adversary who would send a wrong re-encrypted identifier. Therefore, when a tag is queried, it sends its
current identifier, [(α0, β0); (α1, β1)], and receives the new value [(α′0, β
′
0); (α
′
1, β
′
1)]. If |α′0|, |β′0| 6= 1 and
if α′0/β
′
0
x = 1, where x is the private key of the tag, then [(α′0, β
′
0); (α
′
1, β
′
1)] becomes the new current
identifier, if not the tag does not renew its content.
Attack based on the private key. The fact that the tag carries out a test based on its public/private
key transforms it into an oracle which responds whether this value has been encrypted with its public
key or not. In other words, the oracle responds whether or not we are dealing with the traced tag.
Let us note, however, that this response from the oracle is internal to the tag. The attacker therefore
still has to recover this response. This is rather straightforward because the tag changes its identifier
if and only if the test succeeds. So the attacker proceeds as follows. She requests its targeted tag for
the first time obtaining thus a reference identifier [(α0, β0); (α1, β1)]. Subsequently, when the attacker
wants to know if a tag corresponds to her target, she interrogates it: she receives (message 2) a value
[(α′0, β
′
0); (α
′
1, β
′
1)] and resends (message 3) the value [(α0, β0); (α1, β1)] to the tag instead of resending
the value [(α′0, β
′
0); (α
′
1, β
′
1)] re-encrypted. She interrogates the tag once again. If she again receives
[(α′0, β
′
0); (α
′
1, β
′
1)], this means that the tag has not renewed its identifier and she is not dealing with the
traced tag. The traced tag would have recognised [(α0, β0); (α1, β1)] as a valid value, meaning encrypted
with its public key, and would have used it to refresh its identifier. Game 2 given in the appendix describes
formally the attack.
Theorem 2. Saito, Ryou, and Sakurai’s protocol is not Existential-UNT-Q.
3.3 Protocol of Saito, Ryou, and Sakurai, Reloaded
The second protocol suggested by Saito et al. is also based on the universal re-encryption scheme in-
troduced in [12]. The fundamental difference compared to [12] is that the re-encryptions are carried out
by the tag itself and no longer by the reader. The tag not being able to carry out the exponentiations
itself, pre-calculations are carried out by the database and sent to the tag from time to time. We detail
the protocol below. To begin with, the tag contains an identifier ID = [(α0, β0); (α1, β1)]. It also has a
finite list of pairs of random values ∆ = ((αr11 , β
r1
1 ), (α
r2
1 , β
r2
1 ), . . . ) which will allow it to re-encrypt its
identifier. The tag contains also a variable i which is the session number, as well as a secret S. All these
data are shared with the database. We must consider two distinct operations in this protocol: the reading
of the tag and the update of its list of random values, which does not occur at every identification. The
procedure unfolds in the following way (see Fig. 4):
1. The reader sends a request to the tag.
2. The tag sends back ID and replaces its identifier by
ID′ := [(α0αrk1 , β0β
rk
1 ); (α1α
rk+1
1 , β1β
rk+1
1 )] where (α
rk
1 , β
rk
1 ), (α
rk+1
1 , β
rk+1
1 ) ∈ ∆
3. If an update of ∆ is needed, the reader sends to the tag a new list ∆′ of random values and the key
X = h(S, i,∆), where h is a hash function. If the key is correct, then the tag replaces ∆ by ∆′ and
increments the session number i. If not, the tag does nothing.
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Database TagReader
request
∆′ = ((αr11 , β
r1
1 ), (α
r2
1 , β
r2
1 ), . . . ), X = h(S, i,∆
′)
ID = [(α0, β0); (α1, β1)]
Fig. 4. Protocol of Saito, Ryou, and Sakurai
Attack based on the random values. Knowing the list of the random values contained in the tag
allows an adversary to easily trace a tag as she can calculate all the identifiers which will be used by it.
So, eavesdropping the communication between the reader and the tag during an update is sufficient to
subsequently trace the tag. Since the attacker has to be present during the update (which is only carried
out from time to time), she can force the update using a man-in-the-middle attack. No authentication
is used in the protocol. Thus the tag knows that ∆′ has been created by the database but it does not
know who is sending it this value. On the other hand, the database does not know that it is sending ∆′
to the adversary instead of sending it to the tag. The session number prevents a replay-attack, not a
man-in-the-middle attack. So, the protocol is not Existential-UNT-QS.
Attack based on database desynchronisation. The danger which lies in wait for the protocols using
synchronised values between the tag and the database (here the session number i) is that an adversary
can cause a desynchronisation between the two parties. Here, if an attacker causes the database to send
the update message while the tag cannot receive it, then the session number stored by the database
will be higher than that stored by the tag. Consequently, all the subsequent updates will fail as the
calculation of the key X, which authorises the update, takes into account the current session number.
Consequently, the protocol is not Existential-UNT-QS but worse, the protocol is not Universal-UNT-QS
because the updates will definitively fail.
Theorem 3. Reloaded Saito, Ryou, and Sakurai’s protocol is not Universal-UNT-QS.
3.4 Protocol of Henrici and Mu¨ller
In the protocol of Henrici et al. [14], whose flaws have been pointed out by Avoine and Oechslin [2], the
tag needs to store a (non-static) identifier ID and two variables k and klast. When the system is launched,
the tag contains its current identifier ID, the current session number k (both are set up with random
values), and klast which is equal to k. The database contains such a 3-uplet per tag it manages, which is
initially equal to the values stored in the tag. An identification done out as follows (see Fig. 5):
1. The reader sends a request to the tag.
2. The tag increases its current session number k by one and then sends back h(ID), h(k ⊕ ID) and
∆k := k − klast. h(ID) allows the database to recover the tag’s identity; ∆k allows the database to
recover k and thus to compute h(k ⊕ ID), and h(k ⊕ ID) aims at thwarting replay attacks.
3. The database checks the validity of these values according to its recorded data. If all is fine, it sends
a random number r and h(r ⊕ k ⊕ ID) to the tag and stores the new values. Since the tag knows k
and ID and receives r, it can check whether or not h(r⊕ k⊕ ID) is correct. If this is case, it replaces
its identifier by r ⊕ ID and klast by k. Otherwise it does not refresh its identifier.
Attack based on non-random information. This attack consists of tracking a tag, taking advantage
of the information supplied by ∆k. Indeed, since the tag increases its value k every time it receives a
request (Step 2) even if the identification finally fails, while klast is updated only when the identification
succeeds (Step 3), an attacker may interrogate the tag several times to abnormally increase k and therefore
∆k. Thanks to the fact that this value is sent in clear in the second message, the attacker is then able
to recognise its target later according to this value: an abnormally high ∆k, i.e., far from the expected
∆k when no attack occurs. Consequently, the protocol of Henrici and Mu¨ller is not Existential-UNT-Q.
Game 3 in the appendix describes formally the attack.
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request
Database TagReader
r, h(r ⊕ k ⊕ ID)
h(ID), h(k ⊕ ID), ∆k
Fig. 5. Protocol of Henrici and Mu¨ller
Attack based on refreshment avoidance. When a reader requests a tag, the attacker interrogates
this tag as well before the reader carries out the third step. Receiving the request from the attacker, the
tag increases k. Consequently, the hash value sent by the reader seems to be incorrect since k has now
changed. This attack is another example showing that the protocol is not Existential-UNT-Q.
Attack based on database desynchronisation. A more subtle and definitive attack consists of
desynchronising the tag and the database. For that, the attacker performs the identification so that the
random value r she sends is the neutral element of ⊕: the attacker replaces r by the null bit-string
and replaces h(r ⊕ k ⊕ ID) by h(k ⊕ ID) obtained by eavesdropping the second message of the current
identification. We have trivially h(0⊕ k ⊕ ID) = h(k ⊕ ID). So, the tag cannot detect the attack. Then
it replaces its identifier by 0 ⊕ ID (which is equal to its “old” identifier) and it updates klast. In the
next identification, the tag and the database will be desynchronised, since the tag computes the hash
value using the “new” klast whereas the database checks the hash value with the “old” klast: the test
fails and the received message is discarded. Consequently, the database will never send the third message
to refresh the tag’s identifier and the tag is definitively traceable. This proves that the protocol is not
Universal-UNT-QE.
Theorem 4. Henrici and Mu¨ller’s protocol is neither Existential-UNT-Q, nor Universal-UNT-QE.
3.5 Protocol of Weis, Sarma, Rivest, and Engels
We describe in this section the protocol of Weis et al. [32] with “Randomised Access Control”. In this
protocol (see Fig. 6), the information sent by the tag each time it is queried consists of a random value
r and a randomised hash value h(ID||r) where ID is the static identifier of the tag. In order to compute
this information, the tag needs a PRNG and an embedded hash function but stores its identifier only.
When the database wants to identify the queried tag, it computes from r and the n identifiers it manages
the hash values until finding the expected h(ID||r).
request
Database TagReader
h(ID||r), r
Fig. 6. Protocol of Weis, Sarma, Rivest, and Engels
Analysis. In the random oracle model, the information sent by the tags gives no useful information
to an attacker. On the other hand, the reader sends no (useful) information either. Consequently, the
protocol is Existential-UNT-QSE which is the strongest security requirement when the attacker cannot
tamper with the tag, i.e., use the Reveal oracle. Otherwise, if an attacker tampers with the tag, she
obtains its static identifier and therefore she can track all the past events of the tag. Hence, the Weis et
al.’s protocol is not Forward-UNT-QSER.
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Theorem 5. Weis, Sarma, Rivest, and Engels’ protocol is Existential-UNT-QSE in the random oracle
model but is not Forward-UNT-QSER.
3.6 Protocol of Ohkubo, Suzuki, and Kinoshita
The protocol of Ohkubo et al. [23] is rather similar to the protocol of Weis et al. [32]. It consists also of
modifying the information sent by the tag each time it is queried by a reader. The difference is that the
hash operation is not randomised but is applied on the (non-static) identifier only which is refreshed by
the tag itself. For this, the tag needs two hash functions h1 and h2. Let ID be the current tag’s identifier.
The initial value of ID is known by the database. When a reader queries a tag (see Fig. 7), this latter
sends h1(ID) and replaces its identifier by h2(ID). When the reader receives the tag’s response, it sends
it to the database which has to identify the corresponding tag. To do this, the database constructs n
hash chains (n is the number of tags managed by the database) from the initial identifiers it stores until
it finds the expected h1(ID).
request
Database TagReader
h1(ID)
Fig. 7. Protocol of Ohkubo, Suzuki, and Kinoshita
Analysis. In the random oracle model, the information sent by the tags gives no useful information to an
attacker. The reader sends no useful information either. Consequently, the protocol is Existential-UNT-QSE.
By tampering with the tag, an attacker can obtain its current identifier but she cannot track the tag’s
past events because h2 is one way: the protocol is therefore Forward-UNT-QSER.
Theorem 6. Ohkubo, Suzuki, and Kinoshita’s protocol is both Existential-UNT-QSE and Forward- UNT-
QSER in the random oracle model.
4 Summary and Discussion
In this paper, we have introduced an adversary model adapted to RFID protocols. We have used this
model to analyse the untraceability of many protocols. Due to the lack of space, we presented our analysis
of [12], [14], [23], [27], and [32] only. We sum up the results obtained in Table 1.
Protocol is is not
Golle, Jakobsson, Juels, and Syverson [12] –
Existential-UNT-Q
Existential-UNT-E
Saito, Ryou, and Sakurai [27] – Existential-UNT-Q
Saito, Ryou, and Sakurai, reloaded [27] – Universal-UNT-QS
Henrici and Mu¨ller [14] –
Existential-UNT-Q
Universal-UNT-QE
Weis, Sarma, Rivest, and Engels [32] Existential-UNT-QSE Forward-UNT-QSER
Ohkubo, Suzuki, and Kinoshita [23]
Existential-UNT-QSE
Forward-UNT-QSER
Table 1. Analysis of existing RFID protocols
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Note that most of the analysed protocols do not respect the minimum security criteria we could
expect, namely Existential-UNT-QSE. Those which respect these criteria [23, 32] suffer however from a
large computation complexity. Indeed, the complexity of one identification is linear in terms of tags
managed by the database but the complexity becomes quadratic when all the tags managed by the
database are identified at the same time (this case appears in many applications, e.g., localization of
people). Compared with classical cryptographic protocols, the difference comes from the fact that the
verifier does not know the identity of the entity it speaks with when the protocol starts, and consequently
it cannot determine which key it should use. Using asymmetric encryption would be a way to reduce the
complexity but this approach is quite unrealistic. Some other approaches have been proposed, e.g., [3]
which is based on time-memory trade-offs, and [22] which relies on a tree.
Finally, the work presented in this paper is the first step towards the formalisation of the security of
RFID protocols in terms of traceability. Our goal was to provide a model suited to the existing RFID
protocols, without losing the generality of the model. Thus, the model has been described with 3-round
protocols because the existing RFID protocols are based on such a scheme or can be reduced to it.
However, the model could be straightforwardly extended to more general protocols.
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Appendix
Game 1 (Existential-UNT-Q)
Parameters: `ref = 1, `chal = 1, O = {Q}.
1. A requests the Challenger then receives her target T .
2. A chooses I = {i} and calls Query(piiT , [(α0, β0); (α1, α1)]) where α0, β0, α1 ∈R G.
She then receives ΩˆI(T ).
3. A requests the Challenger then receives T1 and T2.
4. A chooses I1 = I2 = {i+ 1}.
5. A calls Query(pii+1T1 , ∗) and Query(pii+1T2 , ∗). She then receives
[(α01 , β01); (α11 , β11)] from ΩˆI1(T1) and [(α02 , β02); (α12 , β12)] from ΩˆI2(T2).
6. If ((α11 = β11) ∧ (α12 6= β12)) then A outputs T1 else
((α11 6= β11) ∧ (α12 = β12)) then A outputs T2 else
we have ((α11 = β11) ∧ (α12 = β12)) therefore A picks i ∈R {1, 2} and outputs Ti.
The advantage of A is:
AdvUNTGolle(A) = 2
(
1− 1
2
Pr((α11 = β11) ∧ (α12 = β12))
)
− 1 = 1− 1
2q
,
where q is the order of G. Consequently, the protocol is not Existential-UNT-Q. Note however, the protocol
is Universal-UNT-Q because the database re-initialises the tag when a fake re-encryption is found and so
the attacker can no longer track the tag. Nevertheless readers cannot detect such a fake-encryption: the
database only is able to detect it.
Game 2 (Existential-UNT-Q)
Parameters: `ref = 1, `chal = 2, O = {Q}.
1. A requests the Challenger then receives her target T .
2. A chooses I = {i} and calls Query(piiT , ∗), thus receiving [(α0, β0); (α1, β1)] from ΩˆI(T ).
3. A requests the Challenger then receives T1 and T2.
4. A chooses I1 = I2 = [i+ 1, i+ 2].
5. A calls
– Query(pii+1T1 , [(α01 , β01); (α11 , β11)]) thus receiving [(α
′
01 , β
′
01); (α
′
11 , β
′
11)] and
– Query(pii+2T1 , ∗) thus receiving [(α′′01 , β′′01); (α′′11 , β′′11)].
6. If [(α′01 , β
′
01); (α
′
11 , β
′
11)] = [(α
′′
01 , β
′′
01); (α
′′
11 , β
′′
11)] then A outputs T1 else A outputs T2.
The advantage of A is clearly 1 because
Pr([(α′01 , β
′
01); (α
′
11 , β
′
11)] = [(α
′′
01 , β
′′
01); (α
′′
11 , β
′′
11)] | T1 is not the target tag) = 0.
In other word, no tag answers the same value during two consecutive identifications if no attack occurs.
Consequently, the protocol is not Existential-UNT-Q.
Game 3 (Existential-UNT-Q)
Parameters: `ref = n, `chal = 1, O = {Q}.
1. A requests the Challenger then receives her target T .
2. A chooses I = [i + 1, i + n], calls Query(pijT , ∗) for j from i + 1 to i + n. She therefore receives
∆k from ωi+n(T ) ⊂ ΩˆI(T ).
3. A requests the Challenger thus receiving T1 and T2.
4. A chooses I1 = I2 = {i+ n+ 1}.
5. A calls Query(pii+n+1T1 , ∗) and Query(pii+n+1T2 , ∗), then receives∆k1 from ΩˆI1(T1) and∆k2 from ΩˆI2(T2).
6. If ∆k1 = ∆k + 1 then A outputs T1 otherwise she outputs T2.
Therefore the advantage of A is AdvUNTHenrici(A) = 2(1 − 12 Pr(∆k1 = ∆k2 = ∆k + 1)) − 1 what is non-
negligible when n À n˜ where n˜ is the expected number of requests between two refreshments of the
identifiers. Consequently, the protocol of Henrici and Mu¨ller is not Existential-UNT-Q. More precisely, it
is not Existential-UNTn,1-Q, meaning that the adversary needs n queries during the initial step of the
attack.
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